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1

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over Hercules'
petition for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§34-35-7.1(12),
63-46b-16(1) and 7 8-2a-3(2)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did

The

Industrial

Commission

of

Utah

("the

Commission") correctly apply the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act
(Title 34, Chapter 35, Utah Code Ann.; "the Act") to Thometz'
charge of unlawful age discrimination?
The Court must first determine whether Hercules preserved
this issue for appellate review by raising the issue before the
Commission.

If Hercules failed to present the issue to the

Commission, the Court will deem the issue waived.

Pease v.

Industrial Comm.. 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984); Ashcroft v.
Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993).
If Hercules preserved the issue for appellate review, the
Court will use a "correction of error" standard in judging
whether the Commission correctly applied the provisions of the
Act.

Nucor Corp. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 1296

(Utah 1992); §63-46b-16(4)(d), Utah Administrative Procedures
Act (Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Ann.; "UAPA" hereafter).
II.

Does substantial evidence support the Commission's

finding that Hercules discriminated against Thometz on the
basis of age?
1

The Court will affirm the Commission's determination of
fact if it is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record.

Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P. 2d

56, 58 (Utah App. 1992); UAPA §63-46b-16(4)(g).

Hercules must

marshall all evidence supporting the Commission's decision,
then show that despite such evidence, the Commission's findings
are not supported by substantial evidence.

Grace Drilling v.

Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67 (Utah App. 1989).
III. Did the Commission err in concluding Thometz had
mitigated his damages?
The Commission's determination on the issue of mitigation
of damages is a factual finding.

Ford v. Nicks, 866 F.2d 86f5,

873 (6th Cir. 1989) . As such, it will be affirmed if supported
by substantial evidence.

Stokes at 58; UAPA §63-46b-16(4)g.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Section

34-35-6

of

the

Utah

Anti-Discriminatory

Act

provides:
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice:
(a)(i)for an employer to refuse to hire, or promote,
or to discharge, demote, terminate any person . . .
otherwise qualified, because of .
age, if the
individual is 40 years of age or older . . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Commission accepts Hercules' statement of the nature
of this case, the course of proceedings and the disposition
2

below. The Commission does not accept Hercules' statement of
facts.

Instead, the Commission adopts the statement of facts

set forth in the brief of co-respondent Thometz.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Hercules argues the Commission erred in adopting the ALJ's
decision

in

this

matter,

because

the

ALJ's

decision

incorporated an incorrect legal standard in determining whether
Hercules

had

discharged

However,

Hercules

failed

Thometz
to

on

raise

account
that

of

issue

his
before

age.
the

Commission and, therefore, failed to preserve the issue for
appellate review.

Furthermore, Hercules is incorrect in its

premise that the ALJ erred in his application of the Act.
Hercules also argues that the Commission's finding of
discrimination is not supported by the evidence.
failed

Hercules has

to mar shall the evidence on this issue.

When all

evidence is considered, it is apparent that the Commission's
decision is supported by substantial evidence.1
Finally, Hercules contends that Thometz failed to mitigate
the damages he suffered as a result of Hercules' discrimination
against him.

The Commission properly concluded that Hercules

failed to prove this affirmative defense.

1

The Commission does not independently address this issue,
but instead adopts the arguments set forth in the brief of cor espondent Thome t z.
3

POINT ONE:
THE ALJ CORRECTLY APPLIED THE UTAH
ANTIDISCRIMINATORY
ACT
TO THOMETZ' CHARGE OF
UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HERCULES.
A.

HERCULES DID NOT PRESERVE THIS ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
Utah's appellate courts have previously held that, except

for jurisdictional issues and in other limited circumstances,
any issue not raised before the Commission is waived and is not
subject to judicial review.

Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial

Comln, 681 P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); James v. Preston, et
al. , 746 P.2d 799

(Utah App. 1987);

Rekward v. Industrial

Commln, 755 P.2d 166 (Utah App. 1988).
UAPA §63-46b-14(2)also requires that issues be presented
to the Commission before they can be raised on appeal:
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where
judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies . . . . 2
The

motion

for

review 3

Hercules

Commission raised 12 specific issues.

submitted

to

the

The issue of whether the

ALJ had correctly applied the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act was
not among them.

2

While UAPA §§63-46b-14(2)(a) and (b) set forth two
categories of cases where exhaustion of remedies is not required,
neither category applies to the circumstances of this case.
3

Hercules' motion for review was omitted from Hercules'
own brief. It is attached hereto as Addendum A.
4

As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Pease v. Industrial
Commission, 694 P.2d at 616:
In filing the motion for review under §35-1-82.53,
Mr. Pease had the obligation to raise all the issues
that could have been presented at that time, and
those issues not raised were waived. Had he raised
the issue, either the administrative law judge or
the Commission could have adjudicated the issues . .
Thus, Hercules was required to present to the Commission
all its objections to the ALJ's decision.

If Hercules had done

so, the Commission could have considered and, if necessary,
corrected the ALJ's error.

But Hercules did not challenge the

ALJ's application of the Antidiscriminatory Act.

Consequently,

Hercules failed to preserve that issue for appellate review.
B.

THE ALJ DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY APPLY THE LAW.
At page 20 of its brief, Hercules asserts "(t)he agency

erred, as a matter of law, by concluding that Thometz proved
his case based solely on a finding that he established a
facie

case."

prima

(Emphasis added.)

If the Commission had, in fact, concluded that Thometz
proved his case solely by establishing a prima

facie

case, then

Hercules would be correct in its assignment of error.

However,

a review of the ALJ's decision,4 which was adopted by the
Commission,

reveals

that

the ALJ

4

correctly

identified

The ALJ's decision is attached to Hercules' brief as
Addendum A.
5

the

requirements of the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act as well as each
party's respective evidentiary burden under the Act.

In doing

so, the ALJ followed the analysis of the Act's requirements,
set forth in Sheikh v. Department of Public Safety, 904 P.2d
1103, 1106 (Utah App. 1995), as follows:
To establish a claim of employment discrimination,
the employee has the initial burden to establish a
prima
facie
showing
of
the
employer's
discrimination.
Once a prima facie case has been
established, the burden to produce evidence shifts
to the employer who must articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory re^lson for its suspect conduct.
If the employer succeeds in rebutting the inference
of discrimination, the burden of production shifts
back to the employee who must then show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the employer's
articulated reasons were merely a pretext for
discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion
that the employer discriminated against the employee
remains at all times with the plaintiff.
(Internal
citations and quotation marks omitted.)
The ALJ applied the foregoing analysis to Thometz' case.
Beginning at page two of his decision, the ALJ sets forth the
following analytical framework:
•

Thometz bears the initial burden of establishing a
facie

prima

case by proving he was 1) in a protected age group;

2) adversely affected by Hercules' employment decision; 3)
qualified for the position at issue; and 4) treated less
favorably than younger employees.
•

After Thometz establishes a prima
shifts

to Hercules

to

facie

articulate

6

a

case, the burden
nondiscriminatory

reason for its adverse employment action against Thometz.
•

If Hercules articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions, Thometz must then present evidence sufficient to
prove that his age was a determinative

factor

in his

separation from employment.
Having set forth the foregoing analytical pattern, the ALJ
carefully analyzed the available evidence.

It is true that the

ALJ did not precisely define each stage of his analysis of the
evidence.5

However, when the ALJ's decision is viewed in its

entirety and in context, it is apparent that the ALJ concluded
Thometz had established a prima facie case of discrimination
and that Hercules had articulated a nondiscriminatory reason
for its action against Thometz.

The ALJ then carefully and

thoroughly weighed all the evidence in arriving at his ultimate
conclusion

that

Thometz

had

met

his

ultimate

persuasion that Hercules had discriminated

burden

against

of

Thometz

because of his age.
C.

SUMMARY.
By

failing

Hercules waived

to

present

the

issue

to

the

Commission,

its objection to the ALJ's application of

Antidiscriminatory Act.

Even if Hercules had preserved this

5

If Hercules had raised this point in its motion for
review, the Commission could have corrected any lack of clarity
in the ALJ's decision. However, as previously discussed,
Hercules did not present the issue to the Commission.
7

issue

for

appellate

review,

the ALJ

did

not

err

in

his

application of the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act.
POINT TWO: SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS
THE
COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT HERCULES DISCRIMINATED
AGAINST THOMETZ ON ACCOUNT OF HIS AGE.
The Commission adopts the arguments set forth in Point II
of co-respondent Thometz' brief that: 1) Hercules has failed to
discharge its obligation to marshall the evidence in support of
the Commission's findings; and that 2) substantial evidence
supports the Commission's findings.
POINT THREE: HERCULES FAILED TO PROVE THAT THOMETZ
DID NOT MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES.
The Utah Antidiscriminatory Act is interpreted in a manner
that is consistent with federal

antidiscrimination law.

Univ.

of Utah v. Industrial Com'n. 736 P.2d 630 (Utah 1987); Sheikh,
904 P.2d 1103.

Federal appellate courts have held that after

an employer is found to have unlawfully discriminated against
an employee, the aggrieved employee is presumptively
to back pay.
1527

(11th

entitled

Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, Inc., 922 F.2d 1515,
Cir.

1991).

Consequently,

in

Commission's finding that Hercules unlawfully

light

of

the

discriminated

against Thometz, Thometz is presumptively entitled to back pay.
To reduce its liability for back pay, Hercules may attempt
to prove that Thometz failed to mitigate his damages.

Ford

Motor Co. v. E.E.O.C., 458 U.S. 219, 102 S. Ct. 3057, 73 L.ed.2d

8

721
108,

(1982);
111

Floca v. Homcare Healthservices. Inc. 845 F.2d

(5th Cir . 1988).

However,

it

is Hercules, not

Thometz, that bears the burden of proof on this issue:
Because a plaintiff's failure to mitigate damages is
an affirmative defense, the employer bears the
burden of proof on this issue. In order to succeed
on its claim, (the employer) must prove that (the
employee) was not reasonably diligent in seeking
other employment, and that with the exercise of
reasonable diligence, there was a reasonable chance
the employee might have found comparable employment

Donnelly v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.. 874 F.2d 402, 411 (7th
Cir.

1989); Sellers v. Delgado Community College, 839 F.2d

1132, 1138 (5th Cir. 1988).

More specifically:

Once a plaintiff has made out a prima facie
case of discrimination and has presented evidence on
damages, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant
to prove that substantially equivalent employment
positions were available and that the claimant
failed to use reasonable diligence in seeking those
positions. (Citations omitted.)
Floca v. Homcare Health Services. Inc.. 845 F.2d 108,111 (5th
Cir. 1988.)
Other

courts

have

considered

the

question

of

constitutes "substantially equivalent" work:
"Substantially equivalent employment" is employment
that
affords
virtually
identical
promotional
opportunities, compensation, job responsibilities,
working conditions, and status to those available to
employees holding the position from which the Title
VII claimant has been discriminatorily terminated.
Weaver v. Casa Gallardo, 922 F.2d at 1527.

9

what

Because

Hercules

did

not

produce

any

evidence

that

"substantially equivalent employment" was available, Hercules
failed to prove the first element of the affirmative defense of
failure to mitigate damages.
Likewise, Hercules failed to prove that Thometz did not
use reasonable diligence in seeking other work, which is the
second element of its affirmative defense.

On this point,

Hercules argues that when Thometz accepted work at Blaine
Jensen RV Sales
Hercules'

("Jensen"), Thometz

argument

continues

that

"changed occupations".
after

Thometz

changed

occupations, Hercules has no further liability for back pay.
Despite its argument, Hercules points to no evidence that
Thometz intended to "change occupations" by accepting work at
Jensen.

Likewise, there is no evidence that Thometz7 work at

Jensen detracted from his intention or ability to return to
work at Hercules, in the event he was permitted to return to
work.

The more reasonable view of Thometz' work at Jensen is

that it was merely interim work, accepted out of both necessity
and good faith by Thometz.

It does not constitute a new

occupation, nor does it signify abandonment of his claim to
employment at Hercules.
Hercules also suggests that Thometz failed to mitigate his
damages by quitting his work at Jensen.

However, Hercules

failed to show that such work was substantially equivalent to
10

his

former

employment

at

Hercules.

That

unsuitable work does not constitute a failure
damages.

Thometz

quit

to mitigate

In Wheeler v. Snvder Buick, Inc., 794 F.2d 1228, 1234

(7th Cir . 1986), the court stated:
We agree . . . that the duty to mitigate damages
does not preclude a plaintiff from quitting a
position
in a different
business
that
pays
substantially less money. Title VII claimants are
not obliged to go into another line of work, accept
a
demotion,
or
take
a
demeaning
position.
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted.)
Hercules does not argue that Thometz' work at Jensen was
equivalent to his former work at Hercules.

Thus, the fact that

Thometz chose to quit that work does not foreclose his right to
receive back pay from Hercules.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to Hercules' first argument, the ALJ correctly
applied the provisions of the Utah Antidiscriminatory Act to
Thometz' claim against Hercules. Furthermore, Hercules waived
its right to appellate review on that issue by failing to
present it to the Industrial Commission.
Regarding Hercules' challenge to the Commission's finding
that Hercules discriminated against Thometz on account of age,
Hercules did not discharge its obligation to marshall all the
evidence in support of the Commission's finding.

When all such

evidence is considered, it constitutes substantial evidence in
support of the Commission's decision.
11

Finally, Hercules did not prove its affirmative defense
that Thometz failed to mitigate his damages.

Not only did

Hercules fail to establish that suitable work was available to
Thometz, but it also failed to show that Thometz did not take
reasonably diligent action to obtain such work.
For

the

respectfully

foregoing

reasons,

the

Industrial

Commission

asks the Utah Court of Appeals to affirm the

Commission's decision in this matter and to dismiss Hercules'
petition for review.
Dated this 20th day of May, 1996.

/-^ A— i^ •—u-AJ\
Alan Hennebold
General Counsel
Industrial Commission of Utah
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EXHIBIT A

DECEIVED

Brent H. Shimada
Attorney for:
Hercules Incorporated
P.O. Box 98
Magna, Utah 84044-0098

APR 1 2 1995
^CRIMINATION DIVISION

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

LOEL D. THOMETZ,
Charging Party
MOTION FOR REVIEW
VS.
Case No. 8930254
HERCULES INCORPORATED,
Respondent

Pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R660-1-4A.5 and U.C.A, Section 6346b-12(l), Respondent Hercules Incorporated, through its undersigned counsel,
hereby moves the Industrial Commission of Utah for review of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order ("Order") entered in this matter by Benjamin A. Sims,
Administrative Law Judge, on March 13,1995 (A copy of the Order is attached hereto
as Exhibit A).
In support of this motion, Hercules points to the following objections and
errors:
1.

The statistical analysis included in the Order is misleading. The

statistical analysis contained in the Order calculates the "percentage of workers for

EXHIBIT 1

Mi*/***.

a particular age group from the total workers for the same age group who were
RIFed."

Order at 5.

Based upon this calculation, it is determined that the

percentage of RIFed employees between 55-64 years old1 is "1.4 times the percentage
of the next highest RIFed age group (25-29), and 3.5 times the percentage of the
lowest RIFed age group (45-49)." Id,. As noted in footnote 1 herein, this calculation
is incorrect. In addition, this grouping and calculation is misleading, especially in the
age 60-64 age range, because the populations are too small to have statistical validity.
Hercules submits that the statistical analysis submitted through
testimony at the formal hearing is proper and demonstrates that there is no
statistically significant difference between those employees who were under 40 years
of age and those 40 years of age and older.
Furthermore, assuming for purposes of this motion that the Order's
grouping is more appropriate, i.e,. that the population of employees between ages 5069 is a more valid analysis, Hercules submits that the statistical analysis
demonstrates that there was no adverse impact to this age classification.

If a

comparison is made between the total plant population with the RIF population for
these age groupings, the percentages come out equal. In other words, there were 535
employees between the ages of 50-69 and 23 of those employees were RIFed, or 4%.

The calculation that the RIFed employees between the ages of 55-64
equates to seven percent of the total workers in that age group is
incorrect.
The correct quotient is five percent (14 RIFed
employees/273 employees s 5%). Consequently, contrary to the Order,
the percent of employees RIFed in the 55-64 age category is equivalent
to the percent RIFed in the 25-29 age category and 2.5 times the
percent RIFed in the 45-49 age category.

-2-

FYHTIUT 1

oo7£2

Likewise, there were 1653 employees between the ages of 20-49 with 61 of those
employees EIFed, or 4%. Another way to look at this data is that out of 2188 total
employees, there were 535 employees between the ages of 50-69 (or 24%) and 1653
employees between the ages of 20-49 (or 76%). Of the total RIF popi^lation of 84
employees, 23 (or 27%) were between the ages of 50-69 and 61 (or 73%) were between
the ages of 20-49.
Rather than support a finding of age discrimination, Hercules submits
that the statistical data and corresponding analysis does just the opposite.
2.

Hercules submits that other than Charging Party's testimony, there is

no other support for any finding that Charging Party's supervisor (Lisa Hughes)
made the statements "let the younger guys' do the work" (Id at 6) or that his
"coworkers referred to him as 'old man' or 'grandpa'" (Id.) Ms. Hughes testified that
she had no recollection of such statements being made and that Charging Party never
brought those matters to her attention. Apparently, if those comments were made,
Charging Party was not concerned or offended by those remarks to bring them to the
attention of his supervisor so that she could put an end to the alleged comments. The
credibility of this testimony must be questioned.
Even assuming that the comments 'let the younger guys do the work"
were made, the finding that these comments provided some evidence of how Ms.
Hughes viewed Charging Party (See Id.) is improper. The Order finds that "this
remark was made after the CP had returned to work subsequent to being off work
for cancer treatment, and during a discussion with Ms. Hughes in which the CP had
-3-

FYTTTOTT 1

complained of the burden of lifting various heavy items during the inspection
process." IcL It is undisputed that Charging Party was the eldest employee in the;
department, consequently, any reference to assistance for the Charging Party from
anyone in the department would have been a reference to a "youngei" employee.
There is no basis to conclude that any such alleged comment by Ms, Hughes was
anything other than a normal conversational response to Charging Party's request
for help. It certainly bears no weight to the issue of discrimination given the
testimony on the record.
3.

The comments attributed to Charging Party's coworkers and supervisor

are "stray" remarks and are insufficient to support a finding of discrimination.
Again, the only evidence presented regarding the comments from Charging Party's
coworkers and supervisor, Ms. Hughes, is the testimony of Charging Party. Ms.
Hughes, who was supposedly present at the times the coworkers made the comments
about "grandpa" and "old man" did not recall that such statements were made nor
that Charging Party brought those comments to her attention. Assuming, arguendo,
that such statements were made, such comments were not made by a RIF decision
maker and were not related to the RIP process. They are clearly "stray" comments
which do not show discriminatory intent or pretext. See Rea v. Martin Marietta
Corporation, 29 F.3d 1450 at 1457 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Isolated comments unrelated
to the challenged action, are insufficient to show discriminatory animus in
termination decisions'" Cone, 14 F.3d at 531.)
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4.

The Order also finds that:
The CP's supervisor placed the applicant on the RTF list
without reviewing the performance records or talking to
the individuals concerned. There was no Hercules' policy
that the performance records be reviewed or that the
individuals be consulted. However, this action indicates a
great reliance on the information which she carried with
her including her understanding of the CFs capabilities
and of his value to Hercules. It was apparent that she on
several previous occasions had felt that younger people
should do portions of the CFs job.

Order at 6-7. While it is true that Charging Party's supervisor, Ms. Hughes did not
review his performance records nor talk to Charging Party or his coworkers when
making the RTF list, there is absolutely no evidence on the record that Ms. Hughes
placed greater value upon younger employees or that younger employees should do
part of Charging Party's job. It is undisputed that Charging Party was transferred
over into Ms. Hughes' department primarily to work on the MCS program, that
during his tenure in Ms. Hughes' department his primary task was to work the MCS
program, that at the time of the RTF he had very limited experience on other
programs in that department, that at the time of the RTF Charging Party had the
least amount of time in Ms. Hughes' organization, and that the MCS program was
indeed terminated shortly after Charging Party's RIF. Given this information, there
is ample evidence to support Ms. Hughes independent determination that Charging
Party was the least valuable employee to her department when compared to the other
employees.
5.

The Order next finds that notations on the Policy Compliance Committee

(PCC) members' notes reflect the age, sex and race/national origin of the employees
-5-
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being considered and concludes that, "[t]here is really no reason to consider the age,
race, gender, national origin or other impermissible factor when a perscn 13
determined to be eligible for a BIF based upon performance characteristics. Writing
down such characteristics tends to bolster the view that improper facsors were being
considered" See Id. at 8. There is no evidence to support this finding and therefore
must be disregarded. The fact that the notations exist, without more, do not support
a finding that improper considerations were made. An explanation for such notations
that is just as credible is that the PCC wanted to assure itself that minorities,
females and older aged employees were not being adversely affected by the ranking
process and that it did not appear that there was a bias in the ranking being
provided by the specific department management under scrutiny.
6.

The Order's reliance on the fact that Charging Party worked in the

"closed" area of a facility to support the finding that Charging Party had more varied
experience is misplaced. See Id. at 9-10. The testimony does not support the finding
that the "closed" area required a higher degree of skill or technical competence.
Bather the evidence is that the "closed" is simply a designation for the security
clearance required to work in the area and not the technical nature of the projects
being worked on. The evidence indicates that assigning employees to work the
"closed" or "open" areas is simply a decision by management, assuming that the
employee has the necessary security clearance to work on the "closed" side. Whether
an employee has the security clearance to work on the "closed" side is also irrelevant
to the case at hand since no such security clearance was required to work in the
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departmentfromwhich Charging Party was RIFed.
7.

The Orderfindsthat, "Mr, Nuttal related that in bis view, the C? should

have been placed on the bottom of the list because Mr, Garcia 'was a communicator
and could pull people together/ However, there was testimony given by others that
the CP was able to deal with others, and was a facilitator," See Id. at 9, The
testimony which the Order relies upon is the testimony by two ex-employees who had
no direct supervisor relationship over Charging Party, and more importantly, had
little to no exposure to the capabilities of Mr. Garcia. This testimony is further
biased in favor of Charging Party since one witness (Mr. Walker) is a closefriendof
Charging Party and the other witness (Mr. Vilart) was also RIFedfromHercules and
subsequentlyfileda charge of discrimination against Hercules. This testimony must
be given very little weight when compared to the testimony of Mr. Nuttal who was
the direct supervisor of Charging Party, concurred with the ranking of Charging
Party, and was himself 59 years old at the time of Charging Party's termination.
8.

Ms. Hughes and Mr. Nuttal testified that Charging Party was the least

valuable to their department since he had a short tenure in the department, had
limited exposure to other programs in that department and was essentially dedicated
to a program that was ending, whereas the remaining employees had considerably
more time in the department and were able to perform the duties on all the other
programs. Thefindingthat, "[t]he evidence tends to show that based upon the CP's
work history he was capable of performing more varied types of duties than was Mr.
Garcia" (Order at 10.) is unfounded and irrelevant. The evidence is clear that the
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decision to rank Charging Party last was based upon his value to the department at
that time and not what he was capable of doing if given enough amount of erne. This
ranking decision is not improper, does not show age animus, and is in compliance
with the Hercules reduction in force policy. See Res. Ex. 5, at Bate Stamp No.
000446, d x . ("Potential is never a factor in these displacement decisions.")2 By
giving weight to Charging Party's work history to conclude that Charging Party was
capable of performing more varied duties than Mr. Garcia, the Order improperly
substitutes its business judgment for that of Hercules.
9.

There was no apparent consideration given to the fact that Charging

Party was hired at the age of 46, well within the protected class.
10.

There was little consideration given to Mr. NuttaTs concurrence that

Charging Party was properly ranked below Mr. Garcia and that Charging Party
testified that he had no reason to believe that Mr. Nuttal would or did discriminate
against him because of his age.
11.

There was no apparent consideration given to evidence submitted

comparing the Performance Appraisal Reviews (PARs) of Charging Party against
other coworkers, especially Mr. Garcia; such evidence demonstrating that Mr. Garcia
and the other workers were superior performers to Charging Party. There was also
no apparent consideration given to Mr. NuttaTs testimony that he would have given
Charging Party an overall rating of MC-" had he had the opportunity to give Charging
Party a PAR.

2

Res. Ex. 5 is attached hereto as Exhibit B.
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12,

There was no apparent consideration given to Charging Party's failure

to mitigate damages.

Charging Party testified that he di*3 not begin seeking

employment from companies which he identified until approximately August 1994.

Based upon the foregoing, Hercules request the that the findings of fact
and conclusions be corrected to be consistent with the discussion herein. Hercules
further requests that the Summary of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
be corrected; specifically, that numbers 4,7,8,9 and 10 are stricken and that number
6 is modified to read, "Number 4 was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence
discussed above." Furthermore, Hercules requests that the Order be modified to
dismiss the matter. In the alternative, Hercules requests that the Order recognize
that Charging Party feiled to mitigate his damages until August 1994 and that the
Order be modified accordingly.

Respectfully submitted.

DATED this / / W d a v of April, 1995.

Attorney for Hercules Incorporated
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No, 8930254
LOEL D. THOMETZ,
FINDINGS OF FACT
*
*

Charging Party,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
AND ORDER
HERCULES INCORPORATED,
*

Respondent.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah,
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on October
26, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock a.m.
The hearing was
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The charging party, was present and was represented
by Kenneth B. Grimes, Jr., Attorney at Law.
The Respondent employer, Hercules Incorporated, was
represented by Brent H. Shimada, Attorney at Law.

This matter was continued from October 12, 19 94, at the
request of the charging party's (CP) counsel. At the conclusion of
the evidentiary hearing held on October 26, 1994, each of the
parties was given until November 15, 1994 to provide written
closing statements. The statements were submitted on that date,
and on November 16, 1994, the case was considered ready for an
order by the administrative law judge.
The applicable law in this case is the Antidiscrimination Act
which is found at U.C.A. Section 34-35-1 et seq. (1969 as amended).
U.C.A. Section 34-35-6 (1989) provides in pertinent part:
(1) It is a discriminatory or prohibited employment
practice:
(a) (i) for an employer to ... discharge, . . .
terminate any person, . . . or discriminate in
terms, priviletes, and conditions of employment
against any person otherwise qualified, because of
... age, if the individual is 40 years of age or older. . . .
* * *
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(4) .•. [E]xcept where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification, no person shall be subject to involuntary termination ... from employment on the basis of
age alone, if the individual is 4 0 years of,.age or older.
In order to prevail in a claim of age discrimination, an
employee must establish by a preponderance of evidence that his age
was a determining factor in subjecting him to an adverse employment
action. Except for Paragraph (4) noted above, an employee is not
required to prove that his age was the sole motive for the
employment action, only that the employment action would not have
occurred, but for the employee's age. Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 250 US 248, 256 (1981).
Age discrimination may be established either by direct
evidence of discriminatory motive, or other circumstantial evidence
that the employer's stated motive is a pretext for discrimination,
or through a combination of direct and circumstantial evidence.
E.E.O.C. v. Flasher Co., Inc., 986 F.2d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir.
1992).
The respondent, Hercules, Inc. (Hercules), has undergone a
number of reductions in force which were necessitated by the
drastic economic downturn of the aerospace and defense industries.
Since October 1990, the Hercules' Bacchus Works, the facility at
issue in this case, has reduced its workforce by approximately
1,800 employees. The CP was laid off in August 1992 as a result of
one of those reductions in force.
Faced with a significantly
declining business base, Hercules had no choice, but to reduce the
size of its work force. Rather than do this randomly, Hercules
designed and implemented an extensive lay-off system which it
claims maintained the skills it needed without discriminating
against any protected class of employees.
In the case of Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp. , 29 F.3d 1450
(10th Cir. 1994)(Rea), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that to prove a prima facia case of age discrimination in a
reduction in force context, the charging party must show: 1. That
he was in the protected age group;
2. that he was adversely
affected by the employment decision; 3. that he was qualified for
the position at issue; and, 4. that he was treated less favorably
than younger employees during the reduction in force. Once the CP
establishes a prima facie case, "the burden shifts [to the
respondent] to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment decision." Rea, at 1454.
The respondent's burden to show a legitimate nondiscrimination
reason is not very great. The respondent can satisfy its burden
merely by raising a genuine issue "of fact as to whether it
F.YWimT 1
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discriminated against the plaintiff.
Rea, at 1454-1455.
See
Faulkner v. Super Value Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425 (10th Cir.
1993) (Faulkner) . After the respondent provides nondiscriminatory
reasons for its action, the CP must then present, "specific facts
significantly probative to support an inference that [respondent's]
proffered justifications were a pretext for discrimination."
Faulkner, at 14 25.
In other words, "the [CP] must show that age
actually played a role in the [respondent's] decision making
process and was a determinatives influence in the outcome." Id.
Hercules concedes that the CP satisfied the first three
elements of the prime facie case of age discrimination.
These
elements were that the CP: was in the protected age group, was
qualified, and was adversely affected by the reduction in force
, (RIF). This opinion will not, therefore, discuss those issues in
any detail.
Hercules contends that the CP cannot satisfy the
fourth element because the evidence does not show that he was
treated less favorably than younger employees during the RIF's.
The CP's education, work, and personal history will be
reviewed.
He attended Everett Junior College for 2 1/2 years
study±ng engineering and mechanical machining. He also attended
the Seattle Police Academy where he trained in criminal and arson
investigations. He is a certified arson investigator.
From September 1958 until August 1962, the CP worked for
Boeing Aircraft Company as a: tool and pattern maker, plaster and
plastic pattern maker, lead man in the pattern shop, inspector,
and job coordinator.
From August 19 62 to February 19 65, the CP
worked for Western Gear Corporation as an assemblyman, a machinist
apprentice, and in physical and chemical testing. From February
1965 to May 1968, he worked for Everett Machine and Fabrication
managing a machine shop and steel fabrication company. He prepared
bids, set up procedures, operated lathes, mills, planers, surface
grinders, did inspections, and set up metal fabrication gigs.
From May 1968 to April 1979, the CP worked for the City of
Everett Fire Department. He acted as a fire fighter and marshal as
well as senior inspector and arson investigator. From April 198 0
to February 1982, he worked for Beehive Machinery as the manager of
the quality assurance department, and as an inspector.
From
February 1982 to January 1984, he was semiretired.
From January
1984 to May 1984, he was the head of the quality control department
and inspector for M & D, Inc,
From May 1984 to August 1992, he worked for Hercules in
quality
assurance, quality
control, inspecting
end
items,
inspecting received items, and all types of hands on inspections,
physical testing, document preparation, input and retrievable
information, coordinating with manufacturing, engineering, customer
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service, and training of new quality assurance engineers
document preparation for the material review board.

in

He was one of those selected by his supervisor to be
terminated in a reduction in force in August 1992. The list of all
quality assurance nonexempt employees in Department 7 600 in August
1992 shows that the CP was the oldest, and that Jose L. Garcia, the
next to be RIF'ed after the CP, was the next oldest. In terms of
service with Hercules, Shirley D. Randazzo had the least amount,
and the CP had the second least amount. Ms. Randazzo was one month
junior to the CP in service. Jose L. Garcia was number three in
terms of seniority.
However, the CP, as well as the other
mentioned, were salaried employees, and Hercules did not have a
seniority based system for salaried personnel.
There was no
^evidence that the number of years with Hercules was a factor in
determining retention.
With regard to RIF's during the period of the CP's
termination, the evidence shows that the following numbers were
RIF / ed from the Hercules Baccus facility during 1991 - 1992. The
following table was constructed from Hercules / data supplied to the
IC, and reflects the number RIF'ed (top number) in comparison with
the number who were aged 4 0 and over (bottom number) . It must be
noted that the data supplied from Hercules was for the entire
facility, and does not reflect the narrow subgroup of the composite
structures group.
Nevertheless, the Hercules' data will be
studied:
12/31/91
RIF'd
40 & Up

157
84

3/31/92
113
56

6/30/92

9/30/92

35
14

84
39

12/31/92
105
58

The following table shows the number of workers RIF'ed who are
50 and over (classified by the Social Security Administration as
being of advanced age, and approaching advanced age), and those who
are 18 - 49 (younger workers) . See 20 CFR Ch. Ill, Pt. 404, Subpt.
P, App 2, 201.00(f) , (g) , and (h) (1993) . When the data is reviewed
using the Social Security Administration classifications, the table
looks somewhat different than the table above.
12/31/91
RIF'd
20-49
50-69

157
109
48

3/31/92
113
* 86
17

6/30/92

9/30/92

35
31
4

84
61
23

12/31/92
105
71
34

It would seem more appropriate to use this breakdown since the
applicant was in the 55-59 age group",- and presumably discrimination
TTYffroTT 1
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would be more likely to occur the older a worker" becomes. This
analysis would place the worker into a group aged 50 - 69 which is
more related to his age than to the group aged 4 0 - 69.
The
numbers and percentages of individuals of the ages shown in the
following table were RIF'd during the September 30, 19 9 2 reduction.
The percentages shown are the percentage of workers for a
particular age group from the total workers for the same age group
who were RIF'ed.

20-24
25-29
30 - 34
35 - 39
40 - 44
45-49
50-54
55 - 59
60-64

Number

Percentage

0
8
17
20
12
4
9
11
3

0
5
4
4
4
2
3
5
9

It should be noted that the percentages were rounded up or
down, as appropriate, and the total may therefore add to a
different percentage than the actual overall percentage. Hercules
stated that it found that there was no statistical evidence that
there was any age group which was unfairly represented in its RIF.
It might' be argued that the 60 - 64 year old age is represented at
about twice to almost three times the percentages of the other
groups. Three individuals were RIF'ed out of 32.
When the 55 - 59 age group is added to the 6 0 - 6 4 age group,
the percentages show that the RIF'ed number of 55 - 64 year olds
consisted of approximately seven per cent which is more than 1.4
times the percentage of the next highest RIF'ed age group (25 29), and 3.5 times the percentage of the lowest RIF'ed age group
(45 - 4 9 ) . Although the caution flag is raised, these statistics
do not show that the Hercules Bacchus Facility discriminated
against the CP. However, they do show that a significantly higher
percentage of workers were RIF'ed in the 55 - 64 year old age group
than were RIF'ed in the younger age groups. Nevertheless, because
of the status of the basic data, the evidence mustered by the CP
will be reviewed to determine whether the specific proof is
sufficient to make out a case of age discrimination, and in the
course of the review, the data set forth by Hercules to explain its
actions will be viewed more carefully because of the statistics.
The personnel displacement list shows how the supervisor
ranked her employees for RIF. The list shows that the two oldest
employees were to be RIF'ed. The CP was the first to be RIF'ed.
He was 55 years old at the time that he was placed on this list.
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The next employee to be RIF'ed was Garcia win* w.w. aqp
time of his placement.

II , il I In

Out of the remaining four employees, their ages ranged from 40
- 3 1 years• The order of removal of these employees after the CP
and Garcia would be: Robert Fellows - age 31; Dalton Driggers age 33; Shirley Randazzo - age 40; and Steven Done - age 34. The
average age of the remaining employees would have been reduced to
34,5 years if the CP and Garcia were removed. If only the CP were.
removed, the average age would have been dimi nished to 3 6.4 years.
Ti le CP argues that his claim of age discrimination is
supported
by
both
direct
and
circumstantial
evidence
of
discriminatory motive on the part of Hercules,
He urges that
within a few months prior to his selection for RIF, his supervisor,
Lisa Hughes made a statement on two occassions that he should "let
the younger guys11 do his work. The evidence shows that this remark
was made after the CP had returned to work subsequent to being off
work for cancer treatment, and during a discussion with Ms. Hughes
in which the CP had complained of the burden of lifting various
.heavy items during the inspection process.
Ms. Hughes testified that she made this statement out of
concern for the CP, and out of concern for his safety. There can
certainly be no argument against her intent in this instance.
However, it is at least apparent that the statement impliedly
reflects Ms. Hughes belief that the "younger guys" should do the
work because they were capable of doing the lifting and other
requirements.
Assuming rationality and intent behind
all
expressions uttered unless the context shows otherwise, if Ms.
Hughes did not mean to say "younger," she would not have done so.
.iw hearings and trials, words stated often are dissected for
meaning that may have been motivated by the unconscious or
conscious brain at the time of verbalization. The statement "let
the younger guys" do the work, while benevolent, is anathema in the
discrimination contexts and while not dispositive of this case is
some evidence as to how the CP was viewed by Ms. Hughes at least on
the day and time of utterance.
The CP also testified that several of the CP's coworkers
referred to him as "old man" and "grandpa." He further testified
that such statements were made in the presence of Ms. Hughes, and
that she took no action with respect to these statements,
Ms.
Hughes testified that she does not recall these statements being
made.
The evidence of his coworker's statements will be given
li ttl e weight ir the overall analys.ir.
The CP's ::uper\ roi
yi.i^tjo
: h, :; pi . int on the RIF
withou t: reviewing T;- - ortormanco records o> talking to the
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individuals concerned.
There was no Hercules' policy that the
performance records be reviewed or that the individuals be
consulted. However, this action indicates a great reliance on the
information which she carried with her including her understanding
of the CP's capabilities and of his value to Hercules.
It was
apparent that she on several previous occassions had felt that
younger people should do portions of the CP's job.
The CP next argues that there is additional direct evidence of
age discrimination shown by the notes made by the Policy Compliance
Committee (PCC).
The PCC was designed by Hercules to review the
individuals selected for RIF to insure nondiscriminatory compliance
with the Hercules' RIF plan.
As evidenced by the PCC policy
(Respondent's Exh. 5 ) , and the testimony of Mr. John D. Bailey,
•director of human resources for Composite Structures, the process
entailed first ranking all employees by performance, and next
selecting the lowest ranked employees for layoff.
Then, the
rankings and layoff recommendations were presented to an internal
review committee.
The policy committee was to review the
recommendations to be sure that they were supported by job
performance, and were not impacted in any manner by discriminatory
motives*
The evidence shows that the PCC committee was to assure that
the "specific practices and procedures used to identify and select
persons for separation are in compliance with [Hercules'] policies
and all applicable laws and regulations (including, but not limited
to; EEO, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, etc.)." Respondent's Exh. at 443. In
addition, the following four objectives were to be considered by
the CP's supervisor to select those employees to be RIF'ed:
a.

Maintain

the

best

workforce,

upgrading

where

possible;
b. Avoid any discriminatory actions in regard to race,
sex, age, pension discrimination, etc.;
c. Minimize geographic relocations between facilities,
offices and plants; and,
d.
Restrict
training
and/or
retraining
to
familiarization/orientation of displaces personnel proposed for
reassignment to a different position.
Id.
No action could be taken to displace or to separate the CP
without the prior approval of the PCC. The PCC met to review the
proposed action of the CP's supervisor, and discussed the
supervisor's list of potential RIF-'s with her. There was little
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testimony as to what the PCC actually discussed since the witnesses
could not remember much about the consideration of applicant by the
PCC or the presentation made by the applicant's supervisor before
the PCC. The testimony by Hercules' witnesses noted the goal of
the PCC to prevent discrimination against parties in protected
classes, and they testified that they were sure that the PCC did i n
fact do that.
The notes of the PCC reflect that .one member of the PCC noted
that Mr. Garcia was hispanic (respondent's exh. at 313); another
reports that Randazzo, Driggers, Garcia, and Thometz were
"similar," but that Driggers was an outstanding
performer
(respondent's exh. it 314); another reported that Garcia was
hispanic, but also circled the ages, of Randazzo, Garcia, and
Thometz who were the oldest three employees on this list.
The
explanation given by Hercules as to why some of the PCC wrote
information about protected categories was that this was the reason
for the existence of the PCC; that is,, the PCC was to ensure that
illegal considerations had not resulted in the placement of
employees on the RIF lists.
However, no member " of the PCC
testified as to what he or she meant by the notations.
The CP
argues that these notations are per se discriminatory because they
show that age and other illegal characteristics were considered by
the PCC.
Hercules argues that the PCC had to consider what would
normally be impermissible factors such as age, race, gender in
order to protect the employee's civil rights.
There was no
evidence to show that the PCC had a beneficial effect on protecting
any employee's rights. This is not to say that 11 did not protect
such rights, only that such protection would have to be implied
because there was no evidence that the PCC ever found that any
employee was placed on the list i i i violation of guidelines.
Perhaps all of the supervisors were well trained, and did not
ever consider impermissible characteristics in violation of
discrimination law. On the other hand, when some of the individual
members noted the protected categories of the various individuals
on the RIF lists, there was at least an inference that the
characteristics were being improperly considered especially when
there was testimony that nine out of 15 employees of the composite
structures selected for RIF at the time that the CP was selected
were over 50. At the best, there was no di rect evidence that the
notes were made to protect the workers.
There is really no reason to consider the age, race, gender,
national origin or other impermissible factors when a person is
determined to be eligible for a RIF based upon performance
characteristics.
Writing down such characteristics tends to
bolster the view that improper factors were being considered.

EXH
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Value to Hercules was the professed criterium which Hercules claims
was the most important attribute. That should have been the factor
which was preeminent in the minds of the PCC and the supervisor.
There is at least some evidence that other illegal factors were
considered, and although Hercules may argue that the PCC did the
antidiscrimination job for which it was created, there was little
evidence that the PCC acted as the Hercules' Reduction in Force
Policy stated that it would. Respondent's Exh. At 442.
The supervisor says that she placed the CP on the bottom of
the list because he was the least valuable to Hercules. Although
Hercules claimed that age was not a permissible factor for a
supervisor to consider except to use to retain the oldest employee
where a tie existed in a value comparison, there is often little
direct evidence that age is a factor in placing someone on the RIF
list in age discrimination cases.
Ms. Lisa Hughes, the supervisor, started work for Hercules in
May 1985 as a reliability engineer in the Aerospace Propulsion
Division. She was a quality engineer from 1986 until March 1988.
From 1988 to 1992, she described herself as a "pseudo manager= "
She is currently the quality safety manager for the Specialty
Structures Division.
In November 1991, the CP was transferred to her department in
the MCS program because of the needs of Hercules. She states that
she believed that the CP could do floor inspections, and did not
consider whether he could do other tasks.
She claims that she
interacted with the CP daily.
Sometime after April 1992, she was told to rank her employees
for a possible RIF.
She did so.
Respondent's Exh. 3.
She
realised in June 1992 that there would be a RIF. She discussed the
RIF with her subordinate Mr. Nuttal. There was much discussion in
the testimony about the relative merits and performance ratings of
the CP and compared to Mr. Garcia. There was evidence presented
that the CP was generally regarded as being a more valuable
employee than Mr. Garcia because of his more varied experience, and
because of his working in the "closed" section (working on security
classified materials) more than Mr. Garcia. It is noted, however,
that both he and Mr. Garcia were placed at the bottom, and next to
the bottom of the list, respectively.
Mr. Nuttal related that in his view, the CP should-have been
placed on the bottom of the list because Mr. Garcia "was a
communicator and could pull people together." However, there was
testimony given by others that the CP was able to deal with others,
and was a facilitator. Apparently,. Ms. Hughes conveyed her list to
Mr. Nuttal, and he agreed that the CP was properly on the bottom of
the list. Mr. Nuttal had spent only several months with the CP.
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Mr, Nuttal had no independent authority to construct vhe list, and
the list was the product of Ms. Hughes' thought processes, and her
understanding of the CP's strengths and weaknesses.
Although there was little difference between the performance
ratings of Garcia and the CP, and which are proximate to the the
RIF date, the CP had more varied experience while working in the
field. He had spent a good deal of time in the "closed" area which
consisted of a variety of work in security intensive areas, Mr.
Garcia had spent most of his time in the "Boeing Springs" area,
although the CP had also performed some work in this function. The
evidence tends to show that based upon the CP's work history he was
capable of performing more varied types of duties than was Mr.
Garcia. The supervisor says that she was not aware of the CP's
performance in other divisions, and admits that she did not seek to
find out the nature of his performance. She was primarily aware of
his performance in her operation, and she felt that his value to
Hercules was the least of anyone who worked for her.
Ms. Hughes had only a few months more than Mr. Nuttal to work
with the CP. The evidence shows generally that with the exception
of the supervisor, and Mr. Nuttal, at least three individuals
testified that the CP was a superior employee to Mr. Garcia. Mr.
Bradford testified that the CP had a breadth of experience and
ability. Mr. Walker testified that the CP had performed all of the
various quality inspection functions on various projects during the
time that the CP worked in Composite Structures.
Although the
supervisor - denies knowing that the CP worked in all of these
capacities, it is difficult to understand how she could be unaware
of this. The conclusion is inescapable that the supervisor felt,
either consciously or unconsciously, that the CP / s age, and perhaps
other factors such as his health, were significant considerations
which when weighed with his job performance dictated that he be
relegated to the bottom of tho ilst.
The CP did not raise the health issue as one of disability,
and this issue hn •- w t been considered
• •• v.-.h Ln 3 a decision on
this case.
DAMAGES:
.•v^-ro ; cai-L cr age discrimination is proved undpr ut.-ih l.u-,, ••
the t/• /1 r.iss 1 cn : 1: authorized to:
[Ijssue an order requiring the respondent to cease
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice
and to provide relief to the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and benefits, and
attorneys/ fees and costs.
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U..C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) ( L9(J 1)
With regard to back pay and benefits, the CP showed chat at
the time of his layoff on August 31, 1992 he was earning- $2, 411 per
month. He was given severance pay of $9,64 4 to December 31, 19 92;
and he is considered to have been compensated for the period from
August 31, 19 9 2 through December 31, 19 9 2.
He showed that i lis lost wages from January 1, 19 9 3 to October
26, 1994 would have been $53,042. He did not include any raises
during this period which might have been given by the employer.
The evidence shows that he earned i ncome of $19,734. M lioin
Blaine Jensen R.V. Sales subsequent to . hi s termination.
This
* amount must be deducted from the lost wages which he claims. The
resulting amount of lost wages minus the earned income from Blaine
Jensen is $33,307.66,
""The CP
claims
ten percent
interest
which
the Utah
Antidiscrimination Division awarded him. There is no provision of
the Antidiscrimination Act which allows a. ten percent interest
award, and the CP has not indicated any law upon which the
Commission can rely to impose this interest award.
Under the
circumstances, the i nterest cannot be imposed.
With regard to the claimed loss of $1,871.93 from the CP's
investment and savings plan, the evidence is insufficient to show
the terms of the plan, and the Commission is unable to calculate
damages based upon the presentation.
The stated loss of stock
value of 151 1/2 shares of Herculesf stock coupled with the claim
by- the CP that he lost "approximately two shares per month11 (44
shares) at $101.25 as of October 1994 is likewise speculative, and
the testimony did not show any detail of the CP's participation in
the plan, nor did it show in a reasonable manner how the damages
were calculated.
The Commission is unaware of the terms of the stock plan, and
in addition, it would seem reasonable to calculate damages based
upon the difference between the purchase price minus the sale price
or fair market value at the time of hearing. The testimony was not
clear, and the evidence did not show how the damages were
calculated. The damages claimed for stock loss amounted to $4,455
for 44 shares at $101.25 per share. The c] aim of $4,455 i s the
entire value of 44 shares at $101.25, and in order to claim this
amount, it would be necessary for the two shares to be given to the
employee without cost each month. This is inconsistent with the
claim that the shares were purchased at a reduced cost,
In
addition, there is no showing that the wages from which the shares
would have been purchased were reduced by the amount of the
purchase. Failure to do this won] d have created a duplication ii i
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the amount of loss claimed for wages, and in the purchase of the
shares.
Under the circumstances, the Commission is unable to
ferret out the facts as to the amount of the stock loss.
After carefully considering the amount of damages, it is found
that the amount of damages which have been proved is $33,307.66.
ATTORNEYS' FEES:
Kenneth B. Grimes, Jr. is the attorney of record for the CP in
this case. Attorneys' fees are authorized to a prevailing party
under U.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) (1991).
He has billed his
services at $100 per hour. This rate is within the prevailing rate
for attorneys in the Salt Lake City area. Mr. Grimes has provided
a detailed listing of the services rendered, and the hours worked.
He shows that he worked on this case for 93.45 hours. He claims
total fees of $9,345. This amount is reasonable for the services
provided, and will be approved.
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. The charging party, Loel D. Thometz, was in the protected
age group at the time of his termination from Hercules.
2.
He
employment.

was

adversely

affected

by

a

termination

from

3.

He was qualified for his position.

4.

He was treated less favorably than younger employees.

5.

Numbers 1, 2, and 3 were conceded by the employer.

6. Number 4 was proved by a preponderance of the evidence
discussed above.
7. The amount of damages proved by a preponderance of the
evidence was $3 3,3 07.66.
8. There was insufficient evidence to show the loss of value
of the Hercules' stock, or to show that Hercules or its agent
caused the charging party to lose money on the stock.
9. There is no statutory authority allowing the Commission to
award any interest on damages under the Utah Antidiscrimination
Act.
10. The charging party was terminated in violation of U.C.A.
Section 34-35-6 (1989).
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ORDER:
IT IS
party to a
which the
terminated

HEREBY ORDERED that Hercules reinstate the charging
position with salary and benefits commensurate to that
charging party would have had if he had not been
from, employment. U. C. A. Section 34-3 5-7 1 (9) (1 9 91 ) ..

Hercules pay the charging party
back pay of $33,3 07.66, and pay his attorney's fees and costs of
$9,345. I J.C.A. Section 34-35-7.1(9) (1991).
IT

IS

FURTHER

0RDERED

THAT

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Hercules cease any discriminatory
or prohibited employment practice against those who are 4 0 years
old and older in violation of U.C.A. Section 34-35-6 (1989).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (3 0) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written
response with the Commission iiI accordance with Section 63-46b12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
Dated this

/

J

day of

/ - <—~^>~

f

1995.

INDUSTRIAI . COMMISSION OF UTAH

Benj^ainin A. Sims
Adirfinistrative Law Judge

..'NnVniuMETZ
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MAILING of Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Order
I certify that I have mailed the attached docui.ient in the
case of LOEL D THOMETZ, Case No. 8930254, to the following parties fcy
first class prepaid postage on the |^> day of Mar 95BRENT SHIMADA, Atty,
HERCULES INCORPORATED BACCHUS WORKS
MAGNA
UT 84044
KENNETH B GRIMES, JR, Atty,
343 S 4TH E
SLC
UT 84111

IcClain
Nlcole^lc
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EXHIBIT I

Interoffice Memo

^ HERCULES
cc:

Aerospace Company

R.
T.
R.
B.
D.

Schwartz - 8414 NE
V. McCarthy - 2123 NW
R. Currie, J r . - 2175 NW
E. Zepke - S3"5? "'SE
R. Tabinowski - 11157 NW

Wilminaton, Delaware
A p r i l 20, 1990
COMPANY PROPRIETARY
TO:

FROM:

Mr.
Ms.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr,
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

J.
R.
3.
3.
W.
W.
E.
r

R.
D.
A.
A.
D.

F. Hixon/Mr. H. A. Spatz - ABL
L. Novak/Mr. R. A. Weber - Bacchus
Q.
G.

Martin/Mr. J . 0. Mack I I I . - Clearfield
Pza o l i l l o / M r . R. 0. Savoy - Clearwater
P
3. Marks/Mr. T. E. Babbony - Hatfield
Martin/Mr. FL P. Hedeman - Kenvil
MJ
C. Graesser/Mr. J . T. Ferauson - McGregor
K. Hurley/Mr. C. R. Lee -^Radford
H. Heller/Mr. A. L. Meadows - Sunflower
R Forsythe/Mr, R. L. Frank - Simmonds/Norwich-Chester
R VanKoevering/Mr. W. E. Kenerson - Simmonds/Vergennes
J
Samuelsen/Mr. S. J. Ness - Simmonds/Cedar Knolls
r
Bossle/Mr. G. H. Van Arsdale - Simmonds/Ft. Lauderdale

CD
CD
CD

\D

L . J , D i G i o v a n n i - 11343 SE
REDUCTION I N FORCE POLICY

Hercules Incorporated has r e c e n t l y adopted a Reduction-In-Force
Policy which covers a l l s a l a r i e d employees a t . a l l Hercules l o c a t i o n s . In
a d d i t i o n , the corporation has created a Policy Compliance Committee (PCC)
which has the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of a s s u r i n g t h a t the specific p r a c t i c e s and
procedures used to i d e n t i f y and s e l e c t persons for separation a r e in
compliance with c o r p o r a t e policy and a l l applicable laws and r e g u l a t i o n s
i n c l u d i n g , but not l i m i t e d t o , EZO, ADEA, ERISA, COBRA, e t c .
Effective immediately, a l l r e d u c t i o n s - i n - f o r c e must be approved by
t h e PCC p r i o r to t h e implementation of t h e RIF.
Attached i s a copy of the Reduction-In-Force Policy. Also a t t ched
and completed
sample of
L i s t .foorm
i s a bulank
l
~ _ ^ _ ^...w-w
w. the
w..w Personnel
..
w_ Displacement
,
which i s to be used and the information which i s to be gathered on employees
who w i l l be part of any r e d u c t i o n - i n - f o r c e . Please note t h a t when u t i l i z i n g
t h e form exempts should be separated from nonexempts, and r a n k i n g s should be
completed by job, f u n c t i o n , or department - whichever makes t h e most sense.
If you have any questions, p l e a s e do not h e s i t a t e t o c o n t a c t
Bob Currie at 302/594-7089 or me a t 302/594-5921.

LJD/edg

J /

Attachment^^^L^j
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THE POLICY COMPLIANCE COMMUTE:
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

To assure retention of the best workforce, the criteri
for se 1 ect i on of those individuals t o h e disci seed w i 1
he in this order of priority:
a.

Job

performance;

b.

Prior experience, including
. v e r s a t i l i t y and f l e x i b i l i t y
d e m o n s t r a t e d performance an
responsibilities;

the i n d i v i d u a l ' s
i n terras of known
oth--r
fvnctionai

c .,. E d u c H t i o i: i a o o 1 i c a b 1 e t • D t: h e

and

iob;

e.

Physical limitations to performing a function other
t h a n t h a t on w h i c h c u r r e n t l y a s s i g n e d ( s u p p o r t e d by
medical documentation);

f.

Adjusted
if

g.

service date/then
ai i of

continuous

service;

t h e a b o v e a r e eoua 1 __

D a t e of B i r t h ( r e t e n t i o n p r e f e r e n c e
t o the s e n i o r aged e m p l o y e e ) .

shall

be g r a n t e e

The p r o c e s s s t a r t s . w i t h t h e B u s i n e s s Group or Unit
d e s i g n i n g t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h w i l l i n d i c a t e t h e
c h a n g e s and. r e d u c t i o n s a n t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n c h a r t .
F o l l o w i n g a p p r o v a l of t h e new o r g a n i z a t i o n s t r u c t u r e ,
t h e Unit Executive w i l l schedule a meeting with the
P o l i c y C o m p l i a n c e C o m m i t t e e (PCC) t o s e e k a n o r o v a l of
t h e s e p a r a t i o n and d i s p l a c e m e n t r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s .
At t h i s m e e t i n g ,
with:
"

the Unit Executive w i l l

provide

^3fe PCC
CD

•CD

cn
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c.„„
.

—.

— — _ _ » _ _

i_

rcC2

a. Copies of the current organization chart idantifvinc
those positions to be eliminated, transferred or"
combined- These charrs will also identify the
current incumbents cor each position.
b. Copies of the new, approved organization chart
identifying the recommended candidates for each
O Q S it ion.
c. A listing identifying each person selected for
separation from the existing organization. The
listing shall include the following information for
each individual identified:
1. Name and Title, (listed in salary grade order highest first)
2. -Date of Employment and Adjusted Service Date

4 . Performance evaluation ranking or code

CD
CD
CD
^r*

5. Education

cn

2. Date of Birth and Age (in 1990)

6. Recommended action
d. In addition to the above, the work history and
performance appraisal records far each employee are
to be available for review by the ?CC.
III.

The Unit Executive will present to the ?CC, the basis an'
which, the retention ar separation recommendations have
been made for each individual so identified:
a. The rationale for 'keeping MA~ but not " 5 " must be
'discussed - including why "B" cannct be demoted
and/or transferred to another position;
b. Ace is not a factor in the selection process.
However, in the evenr that ail ocher criteria^are
equal (including the same continuous service d^re), _
the mora senior aged employee would be retained; ana,
c- Potential is never a factor in these displacement:
decisions.
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Following presentation of
Executive

,: cr-J

recommendations }y.
'.

f the PCC cDarove:
tne c o o r o p r u t e action, is to be
initiated by the unit Executive in keeoinc with the
established timetables
The Unit E x e c u t i v e shall noi
alter r
h P s Ptcimeranies
ri
cnese
without approval of the PCC;
coes nor. approve any o"

:ne

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , t h e U n i t e x e c u t i v e w i l l be r e q u i r e d
t o d e v e l o p new a l t e r n a t i v e s a n d / o r o r o v i d e a d d i t i o n a l
:?.G Silc
Lets t o s u o p o r ' ihe - o r i o i n a l o r o o o s ;
resubmit these data at a scheduled P C C meeting;

Following PCC approval - and - a r t e
tne ar r ecoec
individuals have been notified of "their imoendinc
separation and/Gr displacement, the H u m a n Resources
Department may circulate a listing identifying these
individuals to other Departments to determine if an
appccpriate posit ion is available for which they may
be qualified and could become c a n d i d a t e s ; and,
Decisions of the PCC are final and c a n n o t be
overruled by. the Unit Executive, but may be appealed
as provided for in the aooeal p r o c e s s .

! p e :E ! p r o c e s s ] s a s i: a i i. o w s :

! L if :l

T h e U n i t E x e c u t i v e w i l l a d v i s e t h e A p p e a l Board of
t h e i n t e n t t o a p p e a l t h e PCC d e c i s i o n a n d r e q u e s t a
meeting t o :
1 - P r e s e n t " t h e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s and f a c t s i n v o l v e d i n
:he PCC, a n a ,
t h e p r o p o s e d a c t i o n s as s u b m i t t e d .
2,

E x p l a i n i t s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e PCC r u l i n g and t h e ^
r e a s o n s f o r r e c u e s t i n g a d e v i a t z . c n from cnar r u n n c ;

T h e FCC C h a i r p e r s o n s h a l l p r e s e n t t h e - r a !
making i t s d e c i s i o n , i n c l u d i n g any a l t e r n a t i v e s
recommended;
F o l l o w i n g p r e s e n t a t i o n s by b a t h p a r t i e s , ^.h& Appea_
^
Eaard s h a l l r e n d e r i t s d e c i s i o n and so a d v i s e t h e Uni^
E x i e c u t i v e and t h e PCC C h a i r p e r s o n .
Th e Appeal n o a r n
decision is final-
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